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Abstract
Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) is a flexible permissioned
blockchain platform designed for business applications
beyond the basic digital coin addressed by Bitcoin and
other existing networks. A key property of HLF is its ex-
tensibility, and in particular the support for multiple or-
dering services for building the blockchain. Nonetheless,
the version 1.0 was launched in early 2017 without an
implementation of a Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) or-
dering service. To overcome this limitation, we designed,
implemented, and evaluated a BFT ordering service for
HLF on top of the BFT-SMART state machine replica-
tion/consensus library, implementing also optimizations
for wide-area deployment. Our results show that HLF
with our ordering service can achieve up to ten thousand
transactions per second and write a transaction irrevoca-
bly in the blockchain in half a second, even with peers
spread in different continents.
1 Introduction
The impressive growth of Bitcoin and other blockchain
platforms based on the Proof-of-Work (PoW) technique,
made evident the performance limitations of this ap-
proach. These limitations are mostly related with per-
fomance: existing systems are capable of processing
from 7 (Bitcoin) to 10s-100s transactions per second
and present transaction confirmation latencies of up to
one hour [25]. Several alternative blockchain platforms
proposed in the last years try to avoid these limitations
by employing more traditional Byzantine Fault-Tolerant
(BFT) consensus protocols (e.g., [10]) for establishing
consensus on the blocks in a blockchain [8].
Hyperledger Fabric1 (HLF) is a platform that target
business applications. It is built with flexibility and gen-
erality as key design concerns, supporting thus a wide
variety of non-deterministic smart contracts (here called
1https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric.
chaincode) and pluggable services [26]. The support for
pluggable components, gives the HLF an unprecedented
level of extensibility, and in particular the support for
multiple ordering services for writing transactions on the
blockchain. Despite of that, the version 1.0 (launched in
early 2017) comes without any Byzantine fault-tolerant
(BFT) ordering service, supporting only crash tolerance
through an ordering service based on Apache Kafka.2
In this paper, we describe our efforts in overcoming
this limitation, by presenting the design, implementa-
tion, and evaluation of a BFT ordering service for HLF
1.03 based on the BFT-SMART state machine replica-
tion/consensus library [4], and its extensions to support
low-latency consensus on the internet [23]. Our prelim-
inary evaluation, both on a local cluster and in a geo-
distributed setting, show that HLF with BFT-SMART or-
dering service can achieve up to 10k representative trans-
actions per second and write a transaction irrevocably
in the blockchain in half a second, even with consensus
nodes spread through different continents. The source
code of the our service is freely available on the internet
for the HLF community.4
As an additional contribution, the paper also discuss
the key concerns that need to be addressed to apply
existing (BFT or not) state machine replication pro-
tocols to blockchain platforms like HLF, and the ser-
vice model and workload of interest in this kind of
systems, which are substantially different from the mi-
crobenchmarks [10] and the Zookeeper-like client-server
model [16] still used to evaluate BFT protocols.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We start
by presenting the fundamentals of blockchain technol-
ogy (Section 2) and Hyperdeger Fabric (Section 3). After
that, the BFT-SMART and WHEAT protocols (Section
4) are briefly described, and we proceed to present the
2https://kafka.apache.org/.
3PBFT implementation present in HLF v0.6 was deprecated with
transition to the new v1 architecture [1].
4https://github.com/jcs47/hyperledger-bftsmart.
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BFT-SMART ordering service (Section 5) and its exper-
imental evaluation (Section 6). We discuss some related
work in Section 7 and conclude this paper in Section 8.
2 Blockchain Technology
A blockchain is an open database that maintains a dis-
tributed ledger typically deployed within a peer-to-peer
network. It is comprised by a continuously growing list
of records called blocks that contain transactions [19].
Blocks are protected from tampering by cryptographic
hashes and a consensus mechanism.
The structure of a blockchain – illustrated in Figure
1 – consists of a sequence of blocks in which each one
contains the cryptographic hash of the previous block in
the chain. This introduces the property that block j can-
not be forged without also forging all subsequent blocks
j+1...i. Furthermore, the consensus mechanism is used
to (1) prevent the whole chain from being modified; and
(2) decide which block to be appended to the ledger.
The blockchain may abide to either the permission-
less or permissioned models [25]. Permissionless ledgers
are maintained across peer-to-peer networks in a totally
decentralized and anonymous manner[19, 6]. In order
to determine which block to append to the ledger next,
peers need to execute Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus
[13]. The key idea behind PoW consensus is to limit the
rate of new blocks by solving a cryptographic puzzle,
i.e., execute a CPU intensive computation that takes time
to solve, but can be verified quickly. This is achieve by
forcing peers to find a nonce N such that given their block
B and a limit L, the cryptographic hash of B||N is lower
than L [2, 12]. The first peer that presents such solution
gets its block appended to the ledger. Roughly speak-
ing, as long as the adversary controls less than half of the
total computing power present in the network, PoW con-
sensus prevents the adversary from creating new blocks
faster than honest participants.
Permissionless blockchains have the benefit of en-
abling the ledger to be curated completely anonymously;
any peer willing to hold a copy of the ledger and create
new blocks to it is able to do so. On the other hand,
the computational effort associated to PoW consensus
is both energy- and time-consuming; even if specialized
hardware is used to find a Proof-of-Work, this process
still exerts a limit on transaction latency.
By contrast, permissioned blockchains require a set
of trusted nodes tasked with creating new blocks and
executing a traditional Byzantine consensus protocol
to decide the order by which the blocks are inserted
to the ledger [17, 18, 26, 8]. Hence, permissioned
blockchains do not expend the amount of resources that
open blockchains do and are able to reach better transac-
tion latency and throughput. In addition, it makes pos-
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Figure 1: Blockchain structure.
sible to control the set of participants tasked with main-
taining the ledger – rendering this type of blockchain a
more attractive solution for larger corporations, since it
can be separated from the dark web or illegal activities.
3 Hyperledger Fabric
Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) [26, 9] is an open-source
project within the Hyperledger umbrella project.5 It is
a modular permissioned blockchain platform designed
to support pluggable implementations of different com-
ponents, such as the ordering and membership services.
HLF enables clients to manage transactions by using
chaincodes, endorsing peers and an ordering service.
Chaincode is HLF’s counterpart for smart contracts
[24]. It consists of code deployed on the HLF’s network,
where it is executed and validated by the endorsing peers,
who maintain the ledger, the state of a database (modeled
as a versioned key/value store), and abide by endorse-
ment policies. The ordering service is responsible for
creating blocks for the distributed ledger, as well as the
order by which each blocks is appended to the ledger.
HLF protocol. The HLF general transaction process-
ing protocol [1] – depicted in Figure 2 – works as fol-
lows:
1. Clients create a transaction and send it to endorsing
peers. This message is a signed request to invoke a
chaincode function. It must include the chaincode
ID, timestamp and the transaction’s payload.
2. Endorsing peers simulate transactions and produce
an endorsement signature. They must verify if the
client is properly authorized to perform the transac-
tion by evaluating access control policies of a chain-
code. Transactions are then executed against the
current state. Peers transmit to the client the result
of this execution (read and write sets associated to
their current state) alongside the endorsing peer’s
signature. No updates are made to the ledger at this
point.
5https://www.hyperledger.org/
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Figure 2: HLF protocol.
3. Clients collect and assemble endorsements into a
transaction. The client verifies the endorsing peers
signatures, determine if the responses have the
matching read/write set and checks if the endorse-
ment policies has been fulfilled. If these conditions
are met, the client creates a signed envelope with the
peers’ read and write sets, signatures and the Chan-
nel ID.6 The aforementioned envelope represents a
transaction proposal.
4. Clients broadcast the transaction proposal to the
ordering service. The ordering service does not
read the contents of the envelope; it only gathers
envelopes from all channels in the network, orders
them using atomic broadcast, and creates signed
chain blocks containing these envelopes.
5. The blocks of envelopes are delivered to the peers
on the channel. The envelopes within the block are
again validated to (1) ensure the endorsement poli-
cies were fulfilled, and (2) to check if there were
changes to the peers’ state for read set variables
(since the read set was generated by the transaction
execution). To this end, the read set contains a set of
versioned keys that endorsing peers read at the time
of simulating a transaction (step 2). Depending on
the success of these validations, the transaction pro-
posal contained in envelopes are marked as either
being valid or invalid.
6. Peers append the received block to the channel’s
blockchain. For each valid transaction, the write
6A channel is a private blockchain on a HLF network, providing
data partition. Each peers of the channel share a channel-specific
ledger.
sets are committed to the peers’ current state. An
event is triggered to notify the client that the trans-
action has been immutably appended to the chan-
nel’s blockchain, as well as notification of whether
the transaction were deemed valid or invalid. Notice
that invalid transactions are also added to the ledger,
but they are not executed at the peers. This also
has the added benefit of making it possible to iden-
tify malicious clients, since their actions are also
recorded on the ledger.
An important aspect of the HLF protocol is that en-
dorsement (step 2) and validation (step 5) can be done at
different peers. Furthermore, contrary to the chaincode
execution during endorsement, the validation code needs
to be deterministic, i.e., the same transaction validated
by different peers in the same state produces the same
output [26].
Pluggable consensus. As mentioned before, HLF is a
modular blockchain platform. In particular, one of the
components that support plug-and-play capability is the
ordering service. Currently, HLF’s codebase includes the
following ordering service modules: (1) a centralized,
non-replicated ordering service that does not execute any
distributed protocol that is used mostly for testing the
platform; and (2) a replicated ordering service capable of
withstanding crash faults, consisting of an Apache Kafka
cluster7 and its respective ZooKeeper ensemble [16]. At
the time of this writing, both modules have limitations.
The non-replicated module requires very few hardware
resources, but it is also a single point of failure. The
7https://kafka.apache.org/
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Kafka-based module is both decentralized and robust,
but can only withstand crash faults.
4 BFT-SMART & WHEAT
The ordering service presented in this paper was de-
signed on top of existing BFT systems, namely BFT-
SMART [4] and WHEAT [23]. In this section we
present a brief description of these works.
BFT-SMART implements a modular SMR protocol
on top of a Byzantine consensus algorithm [22]. Under
favourable network conditions and the absence of faulty
replicas BFT-SMART executes the message pattern de-
picted in Figure 3, which is similar to the PBFT proto-
col [10].
Clients send their requests to all replicas, triggering
the execution of the consensus protocol. Each consensus
instance i begins with one replica – the leader – propos-
ing a batch of requests to be decided within that con-
sensus. This is done by sending a PROPOSE message
containing the aforementioned batch to the other repli-
cas. All replicas that receive the PROPOSE message ver-
ify if its sender is the leader and if the batch proposed
is valid. If this is the case, they register the batch be-
ing proposed and send a WRITE message to all other
replicas containing a cryptographic hash of the proposed
batch. If a replica receives d n+ f+12 e WRITE messages
with the same hash, it sends an ACCEPT message to all
other replicas containing this hash. If some replica re-
ceives d n+ f+12 e ACCEPT messages for the same hash,
it deliver its correspondent batch as the decision for its
respective consensus instance.
This is the message pattern that is executed if the
leader is correct and the system is synchronous. If these
conditions do not hold, the protocol needs to elect a new
leader and force all replicas to converge to the same con-
sensus execution. This mechanism is dubbed synchro-
nization phase and is described in detail in [22]. We do
not describe it in this work because our experiments do
not evaluate this part of the protocol.
Our ordering service also employs WHEAT, a vari-
ant of BFT-SMART optimized for geo-replicated envi-
ronments. It differs from the aforementioned protocol in
the following way: it employs the tentative executions
proposed in [10] and uses a vote assignment scheme for
efficient quorum usage introduced in [23]. Tentative ex-
ecution consists of delivering client requests right after
finishing the WRITE phase, thus executing the ACCEPT
phase asynchronously. This optimization comes at the
cost of (1) potentially needing to perform a rollback on
the application state if there is a leader change, and (2)
forcing clients to wait for d n+ f+12 e messages from repli-
cas (instead of f + 1) [10]. Moreover, the vote assign-
ment schemes integrate the classical ideas of weighted
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Figure 3: BFT-SMART message pattern.
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Figure 4: BFT-SMaRt ordering service.
replication [14, 15, 21] to state machine replication pro-
tocols by relying primarily on the fastest replicas present
in the system while still preserving its original safety and
liveness properties of the protocol. This mechanism im-
proves latency by allowing more choice: if there is a
spare replica in the system that is faster than the rest, the
optimal quorum will contain this replica.
5 BFT-SMaRt Ordering Service
The BFT-SMaRt module for HLF’s ordering service con-
sists of an ordering cluster and a set of frontends (Fig-
ure 4). The ordering cluster is composed by a set of
3 f + 1 nodes that collect envelopes from the frontends
and execute the BFT-SMART’s replication protocol with
the purpose of totally ordering these envelopes among
them. Once a node gathers a predetermined number of
envelopes, it creates a new block containing these en-
velopes and a hash of the previously created block, gen-
erates a digital signature for the block, and disseminates
it to all known frontends, which collect 2 f +1 matching
blocks from ordering nodes. The 2 f +1 blocks are nec-
essary because frontends do not verify signatures. How-
ever, this number guarantees a minimum of f + 1 valid
signatures to peers and clients.8 Frontends are part of
the peer trust domain and are responsible for (1) relay-
ing the envelope to the ordering cluster on behalf of the
client, and (2) receiving the blocks generated by the or-
dering cluster and relaying them to the peers responsible
for maintaining the distributed ledger.
8If the frontends are programmed to perform signature verification,
only f +1 matching blocks suffice.
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Figure 5: BFT-SMaRt ordering service architecture.
5.1 Architecture
BFT-SMaRt’s ordering service architecture is illustrated
in Figure 5. The frontend is composed by the HLF con-
senter and a BFT shim. The HLF consenter is imple-
mented in Go and provides an interface for the HLF
codebase to submit envelopes. These envelopes are re-
layed to the BFT shim using sockets. This shim is imple-
mented in Java and maintains (1) a client thread pool that
receive envelopes from the consenter and relays them to
the ordering cluster, and (2) a receiver thread that col-
lects blocks from the cluster. Envelopes (resp. blocks)
are sent to (resp. received from) the cluster through
the BFT-SMaRt proxy. The proxy does that by issuing
an asynchronous invocation request to the BFT-SMART
client-side library, ensuring it does not block waiting
for replies. To ensure that both the consenter and shim
perform computations on equivalent data structures, the
shim uses the the Hyperledger Fabric SDK to parse and
assemble data structures used in HLF.
The ordering nodes are implemented on top of the
BFT-SMaRt service replica, thus receiving a stream of
totally ordered envelopes. Each node maintains an ob-
ject named blockcutter, where they store the envelopes
received from the service replica. Once the blockcut-
ter holds a pre-determined number of envelopes (the
block size), it notifies the node thread that it is time to
drain its envelopes and create the next block. After the
blockcutter is drained, the envelopes are assigned a se-
quence number associated to their future block and sub-
mitted to the signing/sending thread pool alongside with
the respective block header (containing the aforemen-
tioned sequence number and the cryptographic hashes
from the previous header and the hash for the current
envelopes). Notice that this thread pool does not cause
non-determinism across the nodes because (1) the block
header and envelopes to be assigned to new blocks are
generated sequentially within the node thread, and (2)
the only structures each node needs to maintain as the
application state is the block header from the previous it-
eration of the node thread. Similarly to the frontend, the
HLF SDK is used to correctly handle and create the data
structures used by the platform. In addition, the HLF
SDK is also used to generate cryptographic hashes and
ECDSA (Elliptic Curve DSA) signatures that can be val-
idated by other components of HLF.
Once the block is created and properly signed, they are
transmitted to all active frontends. This is done by pro-
viding a custom replier (supported by the extensible API
of BFT-SMART) that instead of sending the execution
result (i.e., the generated block) to the invoking client,
sends it to the registered BFT-SMART clients (i.e., the
frontends).
5.2 Durability and Reconfiguration
Besides the transaction ordering and execution, BFT-
SMART also provides additional capabilities that are
fundamental for practical state machine replication, such
as durability (of state, in case the all ordering nodes fail)
and reconfiguration (of the group of ordering nodes).
Durability in particular can lead to many inefficiencies
on state machine replication systems [3]. Fortunately,
our ordering service will not be subject to most of these
inefficiencies as the service state is very small: just the
sequence number of the next block (a 8-byte integer) and
the hash of previous block (a 24-byte byte array).9 Such
small state enables the execution of frequent checkpoints
with little performance degradation. This is important
for limiting the size of the SMR operation logs, as they
are deleted just after a new checkpoint is stored.
A small log and checkpoint allow the addition of new
nodes to the ordering cluster, as the most costly operation
during a group reconfiguration is the state transfer from
one of the up to date nodes to the joining node [4].
6 Evaluation
In this section we describe the experiments conducted
to evaluate BFT-SMART’s ordering service and discuss
the observed results. Our aim here is not to evaluate
the whole HLF platform, but only the ordering service,
which typically is the bottleneck of the system.
6.1 Signature Generation
The throughput of the ordering service (i.e., the rate at
which envelopes are added to the blockchain) is bounded
by one of three factors: a) the rate at which envelopes
are ordered by BFT-SMART for a given envelope size,
number of envelopes per block and number of receivers;
b) the number of blocks signed per second; or c) the size
of the generated blocks. More precisely, given an enve-
lope size es, block sizes bs, and a number of receivers r
9It is worth to recall that in HLF the ordering nodes are not re-
sponsible for storing the blockchain, just to generate the blocks and
disseminate to other peers.
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(i.e., the frontends of endorsing and committing peers to
which the ordering nodes transmit the generated blocks),
peak throughput is bounded as follows:
TPbs,es,ros ≤ min(TPsign×bs,TPbs,es,rbftsmart) (1)
Therefore, we start by presenting a micro-benchmark
designed to evaluate the performance associated with the
signature of HLF blocks.10 In particular, this micro-
benchmark is aimed at exploring the impact of signa-
ture parallelization using up to 16 worker threads with
blocks containing 10 envelopes of 0 bytes each. The
experiment was conducted in a Dell PowerEdge R410
machine, which possesses two quad-core 2.27 GHz Intel
Xeon E5520 processor with hyper-threading (thus hav-
ing 16 hardware threads) and 32 GB of memory.
Results. The results for the micro-benchmark are de-
picted in Figure 6. As expected, the rate of signature
generation increases with the number of available worker
threads, reaching a maximum rate of 8.400 ECDSA sig-
natures/second. This means that if each block contains
10 envelopes, we have a theoretical upper bound of
84.000 transactions/seconds in our servers for this block
size.
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Figure 6: Signature Generation for Fabric blocks.
We also executed this micro-benchmarks with differ-
ent envelope and block sizes, but we omit these results
because they are similar to Figure 6. This is because the
signatures are generated against the block header rather
than against the whole block. Since the header’s size is
constant regardless of the data contained in the block, the
performance remains constant.
6.2 Ordering Cluster in a LAN
The experiments aims to evaluate the BFT-SMART or-
dering service by using clients that emulate the behavior
10The equation consider a block is signed only once by each ordering
node, however, in HLF 1.0 sometimes a block need to be signed twice.
The second signature is needed to attach the block transaction to an
execution context (but details are out of the scope of this paper). If this
is the case for the considered application, the TPsigned term used in the
equation must be exchanged by
TPsigned
2 .
of multiple ordering service frontends. They were exe-
cuted with clusters of 4, 7, and 10 nodes, withstanding 1,
2, and 3 Byzantine faults, respectively. Furthermore, we
also fiddled with the block size, by configuring each clus-
ter configuration to assemble blocks containing either 10
or 100 envelopes (i.e., transactions). This is meant to
observe the behaviour of each cluster when throughput
is bound by either the rate of signature generation or
by the rate of envelope reception. The environment is
comprised by Dell PowerEdge R410 servers connected
through a Gigabit ethernet.
For each micro-benchmark configured to have x nodes
and y envelopes/block, we gathered results for (1) en-
velopes with different sizes, and (2) a variable number of
receivers. More precisely, each envelope size is represen-
tative of submitting to the ordering cluster: (1) a SHA-
256 hash (40 bytes); (2) three ECDSA endorsement sig-
natures (200 bytes); and (3) transaction messages of 1
and 4 kbytes. In practice, and considering the way HLF
1.0 operates, the values related with (3) are more repre-
sentative of the size of a transaction. In particular, our
limited experience shows that transactions compressed
with gzip tend to be usually close to 1 kbyte. Nonethe-
less, measurements for (1) and (2) are important to show
the potential of the ordering service if different design
choices were taken in future versions of the platform.
Measurements for the throughput associated to block
generation were gathered at ordering node 0 (the leader
replica of BFT-SMART’s replication protocol). To reach
the system’s peak throughput, each execution was per-
formed using 16 to 32 clients distributed across 2 ad-
ditional machines. We also repeated the the micro-
benchmark with 4 nodes with blocks of 100 envelopes.
All experiments used 16 signing threads (to match the
number of available cores) and were repeated 3 times
taking 5 minutes each.
Results. The obtained results for local-area are pre-
sented in Figure 7. Even though throughput drops when
increasing the number of receivers, the impact of the
number of receivers is considerably smaller for larger
transactions (1k and 4 kbytes). This is because for these
envelope sizes, the overhead of the replication protocol
is greater than the overhead of transmitting blocks of 10
and 40 kbytes. In particular, since the batch limit of the
BFT-SMART is set to 400 requests, the PROPOSE mes-
sage of the underlying replication protocol can have up
to 0.39/1.6 Mbytes for these envelope sizes.
It can be observed that when using 10 envelopes/block
(Figures 7a, 7c, and 7e), the maximum throughput
observed is approximately 50.000 transactions/second
(when there exists only 1 to 2 receivers in the sys-
tem), which is below the values observed in Section 6.1.
Nonetheless, this can be explained by the fact that signa-
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(b) 4 orderers, 100 envelopes/block.
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(c) 7 orderers, 10 envelopes/block.
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(d) 7 orderers, 100 envelopes/block.
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 1 2  4  8  16  32
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (k
tra
ns
/s
ec
)
Number of receivers
40 bytes
200 bytes
1 kbytes
4 kbytes
(e) 10 orderers, 10 envelopes/block.
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(f) 10 orderers, 100 envelopes/block.
Figure 7: BFT-SMART Ordering Service throughput for different envelope, block and cluster sizes.
ture generation needs to share CPU power with the repli-
cation protocol, hence creating a thug-of-war between
the application’s worker threads and BFT-SMART’s I/O
threads and queues – in particular, BFT-SMART alone
can take up to 60% of CPU usage when executing a
void service with asynchronous clients. Hence, the
performance drop in relation to the micro-benchmark
from Section 6.1 – which executed in a single machine,
stripped of the overhead associated with BFT-SMART–
is to be expected. Moreover, for up to 2 receivers and
envelope sizes of 1 and 4 kbytes, the peak throughput
becomes similar to the results observed in [4]. This is
7
because for these request sizes BFT-SMART is unable
to order envelopes at a rate equal to the rate at which the
system is able to produce signatures.
Figures 7b, 7d, and 7f show the results obtained for
100 envelopes/block, when each node is not subject to
CPU exhaustion. It can be observed that, across all clus-
ter sizes, throughput is significantly higher for smaller
envelope sizes and up to 8 receivers. This happens be-
cause even though each node creates blocks at a lower
rate – approximately 1100 blocks per seconds – each
block contains 100 envelopes instead of only 10. More-
over, this configuration makes the rate at which en-
velopes are ordered to become similar to the rate at which
blocks are created. This means that for smaller enve-
lope sizes, it is better to adjust the nodes’ configura-
tion to avoid consuming all the CPU time and rely on
the rate of envelope arrival. However, for envelopes of
1 and 4 kbytes the behavior is similar to using 10 en-
velopes/block, specially from 7 nodes onward. This is
because for larger envelope sizes – as discussed previ-
ously – the predominant overhead becomes the repli-
cation protocol. Interestingly, for a larger number of
receivers (16 and 32), throughput converges to similar
values across all combinations of envelope/cluster/block
sizes. Whereas for larger envelope sizes this is due to the
overhead of the replication protocol, for smaller envelope
sizes this happens because the transmission of blocks to
the receivers becomes the predominant overhead.
6.3 Geo-distributed Ordering Cluster
In addition to the aforementioned micro-benchmarks
deployed in a local datacenter, we also conducted a
geo-distributed benchmark focused on collecting latency
measurements at 4 frontends scattered across the Amer-
icas, with the nodes of the ordering service distributed
all around the world: Oregon, Ireland, Sydney, and
Sa˜o Paulo (four BFT-SMART replicas), with Virginia
standing as WHEAT’s additional replica (five replicas).
Since signatures generation requires considerable CPU
power, we used instances of the type m4.4xlarge, with
16 virtual CPUs each. The frontends were deployed in
Canada (frontend only), Oregon (collocated with leader
node weighting Vmax in WHEAT), Virginia (collocated
with non-leader node, but still weighting Vmax) and Sa˜o
Paulo.11 Each frontend was configured to launch enough
client threads to keep node throughput always above
1000 transactions/second.
Results. Figure 8 presents the results for the geo-
distributed micro-benchmark with a a block size of 10
11According to the WHEAT binary weight distribution for BFT state
machine replication [23], when using five replicas, two of them will
have weight Vmax = 2 and the remaining three will have Vmin = 1.
envelopes. As expected, WHEAT’s latency is consis-
tently lower than BFT-SMART’s across all frontends by
almost 50%. It is worth pointing out that envelope size
has a relatively minor impact on latency: across all re-
gions, the difference between a 40 and a 4k bytes en-
velope was never above 29 milliseconds for any per-
centile or protocol. In fact, it is the placement of the
frontends that can exhibit a larger impact on latency:
the difference between Virginia (weighted Vmax) and Sa˜o
Paulo (weighted Vmin) is above 43 milliseconds for BFT-
SMART (+6.5%) and above 90 milliseconds (+23%) for
WHEAT. In addition, the difference between Sa˜o Paulo
and Oregon/Canada is even larger (58 milliseconds for
BFT-SMART and 100 miliseconds for WHEAT, cor-
responding to an increase of +8,5% and +27% respec-
tively).
We also repeated the experiment for blocks of 100 en-
velopes (Figure 9). The results are similar to the previous
experiment, but with increased latency (up to 63 millisec-
onds higher). This is because with similar workload but a
larger block size, the rate of block generation decreases,
which has a direct impact on latency.
7 Related Work
The concept of blockchain was originally introduced
by Bitcoin to solve the double spending problem as-
sociated with crypto-currency in permissionless peer-
to-peer networks [19]. Since Bitcoin’s inception and
widespread adoption, other platforms based on Proof-of-
Work blockchain have emerged. Within these new plat-
forms, Ethereum is particularly relevant for its support of
smart contracts [27].
Because of the known performance penalty associated
with Proof-of-Work creation and the fact that Blockchain
technology is gaining the attention of many industries,
the idea of permissioned blockchains are quickly gain-
ing traction. Examples of other permissioned blockchain
platforms include Chain,12 which uses the Federated
Consensus algorithm.13 Tendermint [17] implements the
BFT protocol designed by Buchman et. al.[5]. Kadena
[18] uses a variant of the Raft consensu protocol [20]
adapted to Byzantine faults [11]. Finally, Symbiont As-
sembly14 uses a Go implementation of the Mod-SMaRt
algorithm [22] and heavily follows the design of BFT-
SMART. A recent survey compares all these permis-
sioned protocols and points BFT-SMART as a promi-
nent candidate for implementing this type of ledgers.
12https://chain.com/
13https://chain.com/docs/1.2/protocol/papers/
federated-consensus
14https://symbiont.io/technology/assembly/
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Figure 8: Amazon EC2 latency results (4 receivers, blocks with 10 envelopes).
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Figure 9: Amazon EC2 latency results (4 receivers, blocks with 100 envelopes).
8 Conclusion
The evaluation confirms the initial hypothesis about peak
throughput being bounded either by the rate at which
signatures can generated by a replica, or the rate of en-
velopes ordered by the total order protocol. Moreover,
the results also suggest that, for smaller envelope sizes,
increasing the block size while decreasing the rate of sig-
nature generation can yield higher transactional through-
put than to simply rely on the maximum possible rate of
signature generation. Nonetheless, for a higher number
of repliers, throughput tends to converge to similar val-
ues across all micro-benchmarks. Even when transmit-
ting blocks of 400 kbytes to 32 receivers in a cluster of 10
nodes, the ordering service still reaches a peak through-
put of approximately 2200 transactions/second – which
9
is more 2× of Ethereum’s theoretical peak of 1000 trans-
actions/second [7], and vastly superior than Bitcoin’s
peak of 7 transaction/second [25]. Finally, latency mea-
surements taken from a geo-replicated setting are also
shown attractive, with values within half a second under
moderate workload using WHEAT, even when account-
ing for large block sizes.
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